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Restoring and Maintaining Order in Complex Peace 
Operations: The Search for a Legal Framework. 
Michael J. Kelly 
The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999, pp.311. 
Reviewed by Oleksandra Baglayt 
This book is an impo1iant contribution to the literature on the law of 
occupation and its role in regulation of international peace operations in 
collapsed states. Restoring and Maintaining Order in Complex Peace 
Operations provides a valuable insight into the practical side of peace 
operations. Written by Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. Kelly, who served 
as a military advisor to the Australian contingent in Somalia, 1 it is also 
remarkable for its detailed scholarly analysis of existing law of occupa-
tion, its historic development and implications for the future. Kelly 
argues that it is "both desirable and useful"2 to apply laws of occupation 
in situations where an intervening force has occupied a foreign territory 
without the agreement of the sovereign authority of that territory. 3 
While I cannot deny the rationale for using law of occupation as a 
guideline for action, its status as a "desirable" legal framework cannot 
be accepted without some reservations. 
Kelly's analysis of the law is primarily based on the Somalia case 
study, but is effectively complemented by the references to similar 
situations in the Balkans and in the Middle East. The book covers only a 
t LL.B (Kiev National Economic University, Kiev, Ukraine, 1999), LL.M in Comparative 
Constitutional Law (Central European University, Budapest, Hungary, 2000), LL.M student 
at Dalhousie University (anticipated October 2001). 
I Michael Kelly "Preface" in Michael Kelly, Restoring and Maintaining Order in Com-
plex Peace Operations: The Search for a Legal Framework (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 1999) at xiii. 
2 Ibid. at xxv. 
3 As a rule, an agreement between the Secretary-General and the host government 
specifically deals with the status of the intervening force and its relations with the local 
population. When no civil authority exists in the zone of conflict and, consequently, no 
agreement can be concluded, the international contingent may face the problem of establishing 
a legal framework for its actions. The book proposes some legal alternatives to deal with such 
situations. 
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short period of international presence in Somalia: from December 1992 
to March 1995. During that period, the international contingent in 
Somalia was acting within the framework of two consecutive missions: 
the United Task Force (UNITAF)4 and the United Nations Operations in 
Somalia II (UNOSOM II). 5 
Part I, "Problem," introduces the reader to the case study of Somalia. 
It provides a detailed background of the conflict and an overview of the 
UNITAF and UNOSOM II operations. At the time of deployment, 
UNIT AF was the only "organized entity capable of exercising authority 
in the areas it occupied."6 In fact, it assumed the powers of the sovereign 
in many spheres of public life, 7 including disarmament, air space and 
ports control, detainee handling, judiciary function, and regulation of 
the local media. 8 Significant problems, which UNIT AF and later 
UNOSOM II faced in resolving these multiple tasks, were largely a 
consequence of the absence of a proper legal framework for action.9 
Kelly contends that had the laws of occupation been applied, UNOSOM 
II might have been more successful in completing its primary tasks. 10 To 
support his argument, the author cites the experience of the Australian 
contingent in Somalia, 11 which successfully used the laws of occupation 
as guidelines for managing a public security function in a collapsed 
state. 
Part II, "Solution," describes the historical development of the laws 
of occupation from the 1874 Brnssels Code to the 1977 Additional 
Protocols to the Geneva Conventions. In considering that most peace 
operations are carried out under the auspices of the United Nations, 
Kelly analyzes in detail the application of the core documents of the 
laws of occupation - the 1907 Hague Regulations, the F om th Geneva 
Convention and Additional Protocol I - to the UN-authorized 12 and UN-
4 A UN authorized, but US led force deployed in the period of December 1992 May 
1993. See supra note l at 3. 
5 A UN commanded or "blue helmet" force deployed from May 1993 until March 1995 
(ibid). 
6 Supra note 1 at 29. 
7 Ibid at 16. 
8 Ibid at 15. 
9 Kelly, supra note 1 at 29, 83-87. 
I 0 Ibid. at 90. 
11 The Australian contingent has served within the strncture of UNIT AF in January May 
1993 and later for a short period within UNOSOM II. Ibid. at 33. 
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commanded (or "blue helmet") missions. 13 The author concludes that 
many of the rules of the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Hague 
Regulations have acquired the status of customary international law14 
and, consequently, bind all the contingents involved in UN operations as 
well as the UN as an organization. Kelly emphasizes that, collectively, 
the laws of occupation should be applied in peace operations not only 
because they are fonnally binding but also because they are practical. In 
looking at some aspects of the exercise of civil authority, such as due 
process, arrest and detention, preventive security action, and regulation 
of the media, Kelly points out two main advantages of the laws of 
occupation. First, they guarantee basic humanitarian standards for the 
population in the occupied territory. Second, they provide a legal basis 
for the activities of an international force in the restoration of law and 
order in situations where the occupying force is the only effective 
authority in a collapsed state. 15 
Part III, "Conclusions," discusses the criteria for the UN interven-
tions and the challenges which international forces face in peace opera-
tions. Kelly sets out the main issues to be addressed in conflicts, namely: 
legitimacy, organization of the mission, support for the intervening 
force, intelligence, discipline, and capability of the force. 16 He suggests 
some reformative measures, which could increase the effectiveness of 
peace operations. In particular, he proposes some changes in the organi-
zation, c01mnand and control of peace operations at the UN level as well 
as at the level of separate military units. 
For all its strengths in comprehensive analysis of the law and useful 
practical reco1mnendations, the book has some weaknesses. My first 
12 In UN-authorized operations the forces of the member states conduct an operation 
under a Security Council mandate but remain under the national command. Each national 
contingent is bound by the conventions to which a sending state is a party and each state bears 
individual responsibility for the observation of those conventions. Ibid. at 167, 169. 
13 The "blue helmet" forces are assigned to the UN command under an agreement between 
the UN and a member State. The national commander of the force becomes directly 
subordinated to the UN Secretmy-General or his Special Representative. The forces under the 
UN c01mnand do not lose their status as national contingents and "bring to the UN operation 
all the applicable international conventions to which their respective governments have 
acceded." The UN itself is not a party to either of the conventions constituting a body of the 
laws of occupation. Ibid at 168, 175, 177, 178. 
14 Ibid at 181. 
15 Ibid at 216. 
16 Ibid at 241. 
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reservation concerns the author's argument regarding the extensive use 
of the 1907 Hague Regulations as guidelines for peacekeeping and 
peace enforcement forces. While I can agree with the rationale of 
applying the Fourth Geneva Convention to internal conflicts, I have 
doubts about the relevance of the Hague Regulations to current 
situations. As Kelly notes in Chapter VI, the Hague Regulations were 
"regarded as the codified expression of the laws and customs of war."17 
The law of the Hague was a product of a particular period of history in 
international law - the Peace conferences of 1899 and 1907.18 Today, 
the majority of the conflicts in the world are internal. Thus the Hague 
Regulations are losing their significance because they were intended for 
application to international anned conflicts. Moreover, the provisions of 
the Hague Regulations survive only to the extent that the Fourth Geneva 
Convention does not supersede them. 19 Therefore, I cannot agree with 
the author's argument about practical usefulness of the Hague 
Regulations. 
My second reservation regards the proposition that the laws of 
occupation are currently the best and only legal framework for 
international civil administrations. One of Kelly's arguments in favour 
of using the laws of occupation is that, at the moment, there is no 
appropriate framework to deal with the collapsed state scenario:20 "the 
laws of occupation will be the only framework available, unless the 
issue is more adequately addressed in the mandate."21 There are two 
problems with this statement. First, there are other international 
instruments besides the Fourth Geneva Convention that can be used to 
address issues of detention, due process, and freedom of media. For 
example, the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights and 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms set out the standards for fair trials and may be 
effectively used as guidelines for action. 22 In Kosovo, which may be 
17 Kelly, supra note 1at147. 
18 H. Kindred et at International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied in Canada 6th 
ed. (Toronto: Emond Montgome1y, 2000) at 713. 
19 Kelly, supra note 1 at 148. 
20 Ibid. at 108. 
21 Ibid. 
22 The use of these instruments is, however, conditional on the collapsed state being a 
party to the relevant treaty or that the international force recognizes them as a part of 
applicable law. 
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considered a situation similar to Somalia, the UN Interim 
Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) applied human rights standards 
enshrined in major human rights conventions such as the UN 
Declaration on Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and others. UNMIK also used the Security Council 
Resolution rather than the Fourth Geneva Convention as a source of 
guidelines for action. 
Further, the Fourth Geneva Convention establishes only basic hu-
manitarian standards of treatment and does not provide significantly 
more detailed regulations for civil administration. For example, it does 
not answer the question about the extent to which human rights regimes 
may be applied to peace operations, and the circumstances that would 
allow for derogation of some obligations. 23 Moreover, Kelly proposes 
amendments to the Fourth Geneva Convention, thus admitting that 
currently there are some problems with its application to internal con-
flicts.24 Thus, it appears that application of the Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion will hardly introduce more clarity in legal regulation of peace 
operations and relations of the international contingent with the local 
community. 
I do not reject some of the positive effects that the laws of occupa-
tion may have in a situation where no detailed framework for action 
exists. I would only emphasize that because of the aforementioned 
limitations, the laws of occupation are suitable as a supplementary, 
rather than primary, tool for regulation of peace operations. 
Despite some of these shortcomings, Kelly's work is a valuable 
source of infonnation and a detailed analysis of the application of laws 
of occupation in international peace operations. The book combines a 
unique blend of well-tailored questions, comprehensive discussion, and 
innovative approach to urgent issues of international administration in 
the areas of internal conflicts. These features make reading Restoring 
and Maintaining Order in Complex Peace Operations not only an 
exciting process, but also a good intellectual exercise. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Kelly, supra note 1 at 94. 
